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plications. While the tactics employed in Wiesenfeld to review gender-
based legislative classifications allow greater flexibility in reviewing
equal protection challenges in varying factual contexts, they can only
promote conflicting lower court decisions. Furthermore, the vesting of
so great an amount of discretion in the judicial branch subjects the
Wiesenfeld standard to potential abuse. As legitimate legislative pur-
poses may be arbitrarily set aside, the precedent set by Wiesenfeld is
truly a double-edged sword.
Florence Baum Schechtman
Criminal Procedure-Competency-USE OF PRESCRIBED MEDICATIONS
TO MAINTAIN MENTAL CAPABILITIES RENDERS A DEFENDANT COMPETENT TO
STAND TRIAL-People v. Dalfonso, 24 ILL. APP. 3d 748, 321 N.E.2d 379
(1st Dist. 1974).
In People v. Dalfonso,' the Illinois Appellate Court for the First Dis-
trict held that a criminal defendant whose mental capabilities are main-
tained through the use of prescribed medications is competent for trial.2
This was a case of first impression for Illinois. Adopting the analysis
used in several other jurisdictions, 3 the court looked solely to the present
condition of the defendant and his fitness to stand trial.' In order to
appreciate the impact of this recent case, this Casenote will examine the
purposes of the competency rule.5
1. 24 Ill.App.3d 748, 321 N.E.2d 379 (1st Dist. 1974).
2. Id. at 750-51, 321 N.E.2d at 381.
3. See notes 28-33 and accompanying text infra.
4. 24 Ill.App.3d at 751, 321 N.E.2d at 382.
5. In Illinois, competency is defined in ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §1005-2-1(a) (1973):
(a) For the purposes of this Section a defendant is unfit to stand trial or be
sentenced if, because of a mental or physical condition, he is unable:
(1) to understand the nature and purpose of the proceedings against
him; or
(2) to assist in his defense.
The statute now uses the term "fitness" rather than "competency to further clarify its
intent." This use of terminology also makes explicit the fact that either mental or physical
defects may render a defendant unfit for trial. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-2-1, Council
Commentary (Smith-Hurd 1973). Considering the widespread use of the word "compe-
tency" in the cases and commentaries, and because "competency" is the correct term
when referring to a mental defect, the term will be used throughout this Casenote, unless
reference is made to specific terms of the statute.
For an examination of statutes from other states and a comparison of their scope see
AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW, Table 11-2, at 444-53
(S. Brakel & R. Rock eds. 1971).
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW
The common law ban on trials in absentia formed the basis of the
competency rule. Although an incompetent defendant may be physi-
cally present, his incompetency deprives him of a meaningful opportun-
ity to defend himself.' Today, the trial of an incompetent defendant is
held to be a denial of his right to a fair trial, and thus, a denial of due
process as guaranteed by the Constitution.'
In addition to the protections afforded the defendant, the competency
rule helps preserve the integrity of our criminal justice system by plac-
ing primary emphasis on the accuracy of the trial.8 The rule attempts
to protect a defendant unable to communicate exculpatory knowledge
to his counsel from erroneous conviction. The goal of accuracy also
requires that a defendant have a rational understanding of the proceed-
ing against him in order that he may be able to evaluate what facts are
relevant to the proof ofhis innocence.' A fair trial for a defendant is
furthered by the competency rule because the procedural rights afforded
a defendant by the sixth amendment' cannot be "knowingly and intelli-
gently" exercised by a mentally incompetent defendent."1 Finally, the
decorum of the proceedings is preserved by the competency rule. A trial
loses its character as a reasoned interaction when a defendant conducts
himself in a bizarre manner or sits passively, unaware of the meaning
of the proceedings. 2
6. Foote, A Comment on Pre-Trial Commitment of Criminal Defendants, 108 U. PA.
L. REV. 832, 834 (1960). See, e.g., Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975); Youtsey v.
United States, 97 F. 937, 940-46 (6th Cir. 1899).
7. See, e.g., Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966). See also Drope v. Missouri, 420
U.S. 162 (1975); Bishop v. United States, 350 U.S. 961 (1956); People v. McClain, 37 Ill.
2d 173, 226 N.E.2d 21 (1967); People v. Burson, 11111. 2d 360, 143 N.E.2d 239 (1957). See
generally Note, Incompetency to Stand Trial, 81 HARv. L. REV. 454 (1967) [hereinafter
cited as Note on Competency].
8. Note on Competency at 457.
9. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curiam). See notes 14-17 and
accompanying text infra.
10. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury ... and to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process
for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."
U. S. CONST. amend. VI.
11. See, e.g., Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 384 (1966). "[flit is contradictory to argue
that a defendant may be incompetent, and yet 'knowingly or intelligently' waive his right
to have the court determine his capacity to stand trial." Id. See also People v. Thomas,
43 Ill. 2d 328, 332, 253 N.E.2d 431, 433 (1969) (closer examination was necessary to
substantiate whether the defendant's choice not to cooperate with counsel was knowingly
made); People v. Johnson, 15 Ill.App.3d 680, 304 N.E.2d 688 (1st Dist. 1973) (a defendant
previously adjudged incompetent could not knowingly and understandingly waive the
right to jury trial at a restoration hearing).
12. Note on Competency at 458. Cf. People v. Heral, 25 Ill.App.3d 806, 323 N.E.2d 138
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At common law, a defendant was found incompetent for trial if he was
unable to understand the purposes of the proceedings against him or
assist in his own defense.'" In Dusky v. United States," the Supreme
Court refined the common law test of competency to stand trial by
holding that a defendant needed a "rational as well as factual under-
standing of the proceedings." This formulation is seen as establishing
the minimum necessary for a defendant to be found competent, 6 and it
has been repeatedly cited with approval as the proper test of compe-
tency. 7
The Illinois appellate court was thus faced with the issue of whether
a defendant whose mental capability is maintained through the use of
prescribed medication is competent to stand trial. The only witness to
testify at the competency hearing in question" was a psychiatrist, and
he had clearly stated that, in his opinion, the defendant was competent
(2d Dist. 1975) (a defendant who is competent for trial must be able to actively assist in
his defense; passive cooperation is not enough).
13. Janis, Incompetency Commitment: The Need for Procedural Safeguards and a
Proposed Statutory Scheme, 23 CATH. U. L. REv. 720 (1974). Most states and the federal
government codified the common law standard, and most contemporary courts enforce
this standard.
14. 362 U.S. 402 (1960).
15. Id.
16. See Haddox, Gross & Pollack, Mental Competency to Stand Trial While Under the
Influence of Drugs, 7 LoYoLA (L.A.) L. REv. 425, 428 (1974). Cf. Note on Competency. But
see Oliver, Judicial Hearings to Determine Mental Competency to Stand Trial, Sentenc-
ing Inst. of Ninth Circuit, 39 F.R.D. 537, 543-44 (1966).
17. See, e.g., Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975); People v. Lang, 26 Ill.App.3d 648,
325 N.E.2d 305 (1st Dist. 1975); Stoder v. State, 522 S.W.2d 77 (Mo. App. 1975); State v.
Rand, 20 Ohio Misc. 98, 247 N.E.2d 342 (1969).
18. After the indictment in June of 1972, a competency hearing was held in which
Dalfonso was adjudged incompetent to stand trial and was sent to the Illinois Security
Hospital at Chester. In May, 1973, defendant filed a motion for another competency
hearing, challenging his confinement as unconstitutional. This was the hearing that be-
came the subject of this review by the appellate court. Dalfonso claimed that he was being
held in violation of his fourteenth amendment rights as declared in Jackson v. Indiana,
406 U.S. 715 (1972). The Jackson Court found the "rule of reasonableness" used in the
federal competency hearings applicable to state proceedings through the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. The Court held that a person
who is committed solely on account of his incapacity to proceed to trial cannot
be held more than the reasonable period of time necessary to determine whether
there is a substantial probability that he will attain that capacity in the foresee-
able future.
Id. at 738. The Jackson Court also found a violation of petitioner's equal protection rights,
since the standards for commitment and release of incompetents differed from the stan-
dards for those civilly committed. Id. at 730. See also Gobert, Competency to Stand Trial:
A Pre- and Post- Jackson Analysis, 40 TENN. L. REv. 659 (1973).
1975]
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to stand trial." The court then dismissed the testimony regarding the
defendant's future competency, stating that the crucial time in deter-
mining a defendant's competency is at the time of the hearing and not
at some time in the future.1°
Finding no Illinois cases on point, the court relied on State v.
Hampton,2 a decision of the Louisiana Supreme Court.2 Hampton held
that the use of medication to maintain competency is of no legal conse-
quence. The court added that it "looks to the condition only. It does not
look beyond existing competency and erase improvement produced by
medical science. ' 2 3
The court in Dalfonso thus adopted a functional approach to the use
of prescribed medications. The testimony of the psychiatrist indicated
19. 24 Ill.App.3d at 749-50, 321 N.E.2d at 381. For a definition of the Illinois compe-
tency test, see note 5, supra. Dalfanso's substantive constitutional claims, see note 18,
supra, were not considered by the trial court in reaching its decision. See Record, at 102,
People v. Dalfonso, 24 Ill.App.3d 748, 321 N.E.2d 379 (1st Dist. 1974). Although the
psychiatrist testified that Dalfonso would probably retain his competency if the medica-
tion was discontinued, see Transcript, at 8, People v. Dalfonso, 24 Ill.App.3d 748, 321
N.E.2d 379 (1st Dist. 1974), the trial judge chose to ignore this testimony, fearing that
without hospital supervision, the defendant would stop his medication and endanger the
gains made during treatment. The court ruled that the defendant was unfit for trial; the
defendant then appealed.
Since Dalfonso filed his May, 1973 petition, see note 18, supra, Illinois has made statu-
tory changes, mandated in part by the Jackson decision. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-2-
2(a) (Supp. 1974) requires that a defendant found unfit for trial be hospitalized and
remanded for a commitment hearing under the procedures of the Mental Health Code,
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 911/2, §§ 1-1 et seq. (1973). If the defendant is not hospitalized after a
hearing the Department of Mental Health may petition the trial court, and the defendant
may be released on bail or recognizance under such conditions as the trial court finds
appropriate. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-2-2(a) (Supp. 1974). Additionally, criminal
charges must be dismissed against a defendant who has been confined for a time equal to
the maximum sentence he could have received for the offense as charged against him. ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-2-2(c). At the present time, further revisions are being considered
by the Governor's Commission on Revision of the Mental Health Code.
20. 24 Ill.App.3d at 750, 321 N.E.2d at 381. Cf. People v. Nyden, 14 Ill.App.3d 804, 303
N.E.2d 601 (lst Dist. 1973) (psychiatrist's prediction that defendant might be expected
to have a full schizophrenic break in the future is not enough to raise a bona fide doubt
as to defendant's competency). For a discussion of the difficulty of predicting future
"dangerousness," see Comment, Mental Health- Clarifying Statutory and Constitutional
Guidelines for Involuntary Civil Commitment Procedure Under the Illinois Mental Health
Code-People v. Sansone, 6 LoYoLA (Cm.) L.J. 208, 214-15 (1975). See also United States
v. David, 511 F.2d 355 (D.C. Cir. 1975); People v. Kadens, 399 Ill. 394, 78 N.E.2d 289
(1948); Schmidt v. State, 307 N.E.2d 484 (Ind. App. 1974); State v. Hampton, 253 La.
399, 218 So. 2d 311 (1969).
21. 253 La. 399, 218 So. 2d 311 (1969).
22. 24 Ill.App.3d at 751, 321 N.E.2d at 381.
23. Id., quoting, 253 La. at 403, 218 So. 2d at 312.
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that the medications had the effect of maintaining the defendant's com-
petency. 4 The mental capabilities of the defendant became the sole
focus of the court's analysis, and the use of the drug was important only
to the extent that it affected these capabilities. 5 Under this functional
analysis, the defendant was found competent for trial."
24. 24 Ill.App.3d at 750, 321 N.E.2d at 381. The court's reliance on an expert's testi-
mony can prove to be misguided because confusion of the applicable standard by doctors
and courts is common. For example, the Note on Competency, supra note 7, states:
Initially, the issue of incompetency to stand trial must be distinguished from
the question of civil committability, where the legal criteria are, generally,
whether the person is dangerous to society or is in need of treatment and unable
to care for himself, and from the defense of insanity in a criminal trial, where
the question is whether the defendant's mental condition at the time of the
criminal act was such that he should not be held responsible for this conduct.
Id. at 454. Accord, People v. Britton, 119 Ill.App.2d 110, 255 N.E.2d 211 (4th Dist. 1970)
(noting the importance of this distinction); State v. Rand, 20 Ohio Misc. 98, 247 N.E.2d
342 (1969); Bennet, Competency to Stand Trial: A Call for Reform, 59 J. CraM. L.C. &
P.S. 569 (1968); Lewin, Incompetency to Stand Trial: Legal and Ethical Aspects of an
Abused Doctrine, 1969 LAW & SOC. ORDER 233. See also Cooper, Fitness to Proceed: A Brief
Look at Some Aspects of the Medico-Legal Problem Under the New York Criminal Proce-
dure Law, 52 NEB. L. REV. 44 (1972), in which the author notes the tendency of psychia-
trists to report as incompetent, defendants who are merely in need of psychiatric treat-
ment. Cooper argues that competency is essentially a legal question and urges that courts
make the final determination of the issue by using their own analysis.
Nevertheless, confusion as to what test is applicable is probably unwarranted in light
of repeated holdings in Illinois and elsewhere that a defendant may be competent for trial
although his mind may be unsound in other areas. See, e.g., Withers v. People, 23 Ill. 2d
131, 177 N.E.2d 203 (1961) (confinement in prison psychiatric system is not ipso facto
proof of incompetency); People v. Edwards, 28 Ill.App.3d 216, 328 N.E.2d 18 (2d Dist.
1975) (defendant who is in need of treatment and is educably mentally handicapped is
not entitled to a competency hearing sua sponte); People v. Gibson, 21 Ill.App.3d 692, 315
N.E.2d 557 (1st Dist. 1974) (three months after a jury finding of competency, a diagnosed
progressive mental disorder does not raise a bona fide doubt as to competency); State v.
Spivey, 65 N.J. 21, 319 A.2d 461 (1974) (insane defendant may be capable of standing
trial).
25. Although the Dalfonso court did not use the following breakdown, in evaluating the
mental capabilities of a defendant, many competency tests involve four criteria: (1) con-
tact with reality-orientation to the time, place, and physical objects of one's surround-
ings necessary for a factual understanding of the proceedings; (2) minimum intelligence
-the intelligence necessary for a comprehension of the meaning of the proceedings;
(3) rationality-judgment and ability to reason, expressed as the ability to rationally
develop simple conclusions from readily identifiable facts; and (4) memory-the recollec-
tion necessary for the defendant to be able to inform his counsel of the existence of facts
and witnesses pertinent to his defense. Bennet, supra note 24, at 574. See also Haddox,
Gross & Pollack, supra note 16, at 436; Note, The Propriety of Using Tranquilizing Drugs
to Calm a Person to a Point Where He is Competent to Stand Trial, 31 OHIo ST. L.J. 617,
620-21 (1970).
26. The appellate court in Dalfonso rejected the approach taken by the trial courts in
19751
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The Illinois court also found other case law consistent with the view
expressed in Hampton." The Ohio decision of State v. Rand" held that
a defendant is competent when under properly administered medica-
tions. The fact that the state had discontinued his medication prior to
the competency hearing was unimportant because the evidence pre-
sented demonstrated that if the defendant were still on medication, he
would be competent to stand trial,29 Competency has also been found
in instances where the defendant attacked his conviction on the ground
that the use of medication administered by authorities to maintain his
sanity rendered him incompetent.'"
In addition to the cases cited by the Illinois court, other cases of
interest include cases in which the defendant deliberately ingested psy-
choactive drugs3 or was a narcotics addict.2 The effects of the drug on
Hampton and Dalfonso. These trial courts held that "synthetic sanity" was not sufficient
to render a defendant competent in Hampton or not sufficiently permanent to find compe-
tence in Dalfonso. These courts seem to view the use of drugs per se as debilitating. See
Haddox, Gross & Pollack, supra note 16, at 437. Other courts have rejected this approach
when a defendant has sought to assert his "synthetic sanity" as grounds for reversal of
his conviction. See note 30 and accompanying text infra.
27. 24 Ill.App.3d at 750-51, 321 N.E.2d at 381.
28. 20 Ohio Misc. 98, 247 N.E.2d 342 (1969).
29. The defendant was removed from his medications to "present him in his real face
before the Court." Id. at 105, 247 N.E.2d at 347. The court found the defendant competent
to stand trial under the Dusky test and dismissed as irrelevant the state's contention that
the defendant would present a possible danger to society if released. For a description of
the Dusky test, see notes 14-17 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of abuses
of the competency procedure, including its use by the state in holding defendants without
trial, see Lewin, supra note 24; Bennet, supra note 24; Note on Competency.
30. In State v. Plaisance, 252 La. 212, 210 So. 2d 323 (1968), defendant was initially
adjudged incompetent and committed to the state mental hospital. Subsequently, the
defendant regained his competency and was brought to trial. At both hearings, the court
considered psychiatric findings submitted by the "lunacy" commission (now called the
"sanity" commission, LA. CODE CRIM. Pao. ANN. art. 644 (West 1967)). The commission
performs the same function as an appointed psychiatrist in other states. The defendant
was maintained on medications during trial on the recommendation of the hospital au-
thorities. In finding defendant to have been competent at trial .the appeals court rejected
the defendant's claim that because his sanity was "synthetic," he was incompetent. The
claim that the defendant would present a menace to society if released was ruled as
irrelevant to the issue of competency on the authority of State v. Swails, 223 La. 751, 66
So. 2d 796 (1953). See State v. Potter, 285 N.C. 238, 204 S.E.2d 649 (1974); State v.
Hancock, 247 Ore. 21, 426 P.2d 872 (1967). In each case, the court rejected a "synthetic
sanity" challenge of the conviction of a defendant who was maintained on medication
during the trial.
31. State v. Arndt, 1 Ore. App. 608, 465 P.2d 486 (1970). The defendant, who had
deliberately ingested 400-600 mg. of Thorazine (an antipsychotic drug), was found to be
competent. Due to defendant's long history of drug abuse, however, this normally large
dose had little effect on him.
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the defendant, not the drug per se, were assessed in determining that
the defendant was competent to stand trial.3
The court in Dalfonso set sound precedent in Illinois by implementing
the underlying purposes of the competency rule.3 The holding allows an
individual defendant's capacity to stand trial to be fully assessed, and,
at the same time, preserve accuracy, fairness, and decorum. The flexi-
bility inherent in this approach allows its use in the full gamut of situa-
tions in which a defendant under the influence of drugs is brought to
trial.
Joseph A. Baldi
32. Courts have uniformly held that the use of narcotics does not, by itself, render a
person incompetent. Haddox, Gross & Pollack, supra note 16, at 438.' See, e.g., United
States v. Tom, 340 F.2d 127 (2d Cir. 1965) (in light of evidence as to the defendant's trial
demeanor and outside activities, the use of narcotics at trial did not raise a bona fide
doubt of defendant's competency); Heard v. United States, 263 F. Supp. 613 (D.D.C.
1967) (bare allegation of long term narcotics addiction and other "aberrant behavior"
insufficient to require hearing sua sponte on competency). Cf. Hansford v. United States,
365 F.2d 920 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (because of the varying effects of narcotics on different
individuals, a hearing is required to determine competency where the defendant may be
undergoing withdrawal). See also Lobaugh v. State, 226 Ind. 548, 82 N.E.2d 247 (1948);
Sewell v. Lainson, 244 Iowa 555, 57 N.W.2d 556 (1953). See generally note 25 and accom-
panying text supra.
33. Cf. State v. Murphy, 56 Wash. 2d 761, 355 P.2d 323 (1960) (defendant's due process
right to be present at trial was denied where defendant's demeanor before the jury was
adversely affected by medications).
34. See also Virgin Islands v. Crowe, 391 F. Supp. 987, 989 (D. St. Croix, Virgin Is.
1975), where the court cited Hampton and Dalfonso in finding the defendant competent
to stand trial. Cf. Askew v. United States, 383 F. Supp. 499 (D.C. Cal. 1974); Carter v.
State, 198 Miss. 523, 21 So. 2d 404 (1945).
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